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Abstract
It is well known that the so-called voracity eect can be observed in an economy
with a weak property rights system. Voracious behavior is regarded as one of the excess
uses of the common assets. In this paper, we seek to examine voracious behavior from
a dierent perspective by introducing a new direction of capital ow: from the private
sector to the common sector. A government mandates that all competing interest groups
invest their private capital in the common sector to mitigate the eects of excess use
of the commons. In this situation, we study how this capital ow aects the voracious
behavior of the groups and the growth rate of the economy. The main ndings are that,
while there is no standard voracity eect, an increase in the contribution of the private
sector into the common sector causes more voracious behavior and thus slows economic
growth. This suggests that policies designed to preserve the commons can lead to a
harmful eect on the economy.
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1 Introduction
Interest in studying the relationship between the growth rate of an economy and property rights
has been increasing. A large number of historical and empirical studies claim that one of the
most important and robust explanations of the dierences in economic growth is variations
in the institutions regulating property rights (North and Thomas (1973); North (1981, 1990);
Knack and Keefer (1995); Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2005); Easterly and Levine
(2003); Rodrick, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); Justesen
and Kurrild-Klitgaad (2013); Justesen (2014, 2015); Markus (2015)). Developing countries
generally have a weak property rights system, and it is widely recognized that such a system can
function like a set of shackles, crippling economic progress. Theoretical research in the context
of the common-pool problem supports this fact (Gordon (1954); Lancaster (1973); Levhari
and Mirman (1980); Reinganum and Stokey (1985); Haurie and Pohjola (1987); Benhabib
and Rader (1992), Tornell and Velasco (1992), Dutta and Sundaram (1993); Tornell and Lane
(1999)). This is called the tragedy of commons.
The tragedy of commons occurs when property rights over a productive asset or resource
are not secured or cannot be enforced. The typical examples involve cattle grazing in a common
pasture by many husbandmen or the joint exploitation of a marine sh population by a nite
number of competing shing eets. Other good examples include productive assets or resources
related to forestry, underground oil, and hunting. In an economy with assets commonly used,
each economic agent freely extracts assets without taking the protection of them into account.
This non-cooperative behavior leads to an excess use of and underinvestment in common assets.
Furthermore, the excess use is accelerated by a windfall gain in productivity on common assets.
A series of studies by Tornell and Lane (1992), Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell (1998), and
Tornell and Lane (1999) rstly demonstrated that a higher rate of return on common assets
may increase the exploitation of them and thus reduce the rate of economic growth, making a
country worse o. This other type of the tragedy of the common is specially referred to as the
voracity eect. The voracious behavior of agents has been also attracting widespread interest
in multiple areas within economics and political economy (Lindner and Strulik (2004); Mino
(2006); Long and Sorger (2006); Itaya and Mino (2007); Di John (2010); van der Ploeg (2010);
Arezki and Bruckner (2012); Strulik (2012)).
A novel proposition to alleviate overconsumption of common assets has been pointed out
by Tornell and Velasco (1992), Tornell (1998), and Tornell and Lane (1999), who suggest that
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the private (shadow, informal) sector plays an important role in that that process. In the
model they present, they introduced the private sector into the economy with multiple interest
groups and the common (national, ocial) sector. Each group appropriates a resource from
the common sector and, in the private sector, can use it not only for its consumption but also
for investment to accumulate private capital stock. Private capital is secured property not
accessible by the other groups, but it is less productive. In other words, groups in the economy
have respective private sectors and accumulate their own capital. Their research has shown
that, under some circumstances, the introduction of secure but less productive capital stock
increases the growth rate of the common sector.
However, their research focuses on only one direction of capital ow from the common
sector to the private sector. A signicant body of research has discussed the importance of the
other direction of capital ow, namely, from the private sector to the common sector. Schneider
(1998), for example, showed empirically that a fraction of the earnings in the private sector are
immediately spent in the common sector. Loayza (1996) used an endogenous growth model
to show that an increase in the size of the private sector negatively aects growth. He also
found this result to be observable empirically by using data from Latin America. By contrast,
this negative correlation between economic growth and the private sector has been rejected by
calculations for Canada and New Zealand.1 In addition, Schneider (1998) has shown that the
private sector has a positive eect on economic growth. Thus, the role of the private sector in
economic growth remains ambiguous.
Other lines of literature on the common-pool problem and the voracity eect are as follows.
Berkes (1986), Pinkerton (1989), Ostrom (1990), and Tang (1992) demonstrated that under
some conditions, local groups using a common property regime could manage common assets
quite well and suggested that government and private property were not the only way to
manage their assets. These studies focus on how to manage eciently the common asset but
do not consider the private assets. Benhabib and Radner (1992), Tornell (1997) and Lindner
and Strulik (2008) assumed that agents use trigger strategies. Benhabib and Radner (1992)
showed that an ecient trigger-strategy equilibrium exists. Tornell (1997) and Lindner and
Strulik (2008) analyze the features of endogenous property rights. Mino (2006) and Itaya
and Mino (2007) considered variable labor-leisure choices by changing the linear production
function to an increasing-returns production function. They showed that the overconsumption
of the common assets could be improved. Strulik (2012) used a Stone-Geary utility function
1See Giles (1999) and Schneider and Enste (2000).
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instead of a CRRA utility function in order to reconsider the voracity eect. He showed
that voracious behavior is situation-specic and occurs when an economy is in decline and
suciently close to stagnation. Lindner and Strulik (2004) presented the long-run equilibrium
and development dynamics in the neoclassical growth model and a simple model of endogenous
growth in the absence of secure property rights and compared the results with the outcome in a
corresponding model with secure property rights. They showed that there exists a considerable
gain in the level and growth of consumption from establishing secure property rights, and that
economic performance without property rights worsens with an increase in the number of
competing social groups. These studies considered only common assets. Long and Sorger
(2006), on the other hand, dealt with not only common assets but also private assets. They
extended the Tornell and Velasco (1992) model by adding a private appropriation cost and
utility from wealth and showed that an increase in appropriation cost lower the growth rate of
the common capital stock. In their model, however, the capital ow from common to private
is not considered.
The aims of this paper are to study how the introduction of capital ow from the private
sector to the common sector aects the growth rate of an economy, and how this is related to
the voracious behaviours of competing interest groups. In so doing, we extend the Tornell and
Velasco (1992) model by introducing a ow of capital from the private sector to the common
sector, postulating a scenario in which a fraction of each interest group's private capital stock
is invested in the common sector. In this situation, the obtained results are as follows. First,
we show that the balanced growth rates are independent of the technology level in the common
sector. This implies that there is no standard voracity eect in the sense that Tornell and Lane
(1999) dene. We also show that, when each group values the opponents' private capital, their
capital has a positive eect on a group's equilibrium consumption strategy. Finally, we show
that an increase in the contribution rate leads to an increase in appropriation, and hence the
balanced growth becomes slow. The paper predicts that a contribution from the private sector
to the common sector has a negative eect on economic growth. This suggests also that there
exists other possible cause of voracious behavior.
Therefore, our remaining sections in this paper provides a detailed analysis of this issue. In
section 2, the model, a solution concept, and each group's maximization problem are described.
Section 3 goes on to characterize the balanced growth equilibrium. In section 4, the balanced
growth comparative statics will be numerically analyzed. Lastly, section 5 discusses some
conclusions.
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2 The Model
Our framework builds on the models of Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane
(1999). We consider a continuous time model, which assumes a developing economy organized
by multiple interest groups. The number of multiple interest groups2 is n  2. We suppose
that each group is homogeneous in the sense that each group has the same preference, and
the subjective rate of discount and the technology level of the private sector are common
among all groups. Within each group, there is a set of people who cooperate with other people
belonging to the same group. They do not cooperate with those who do not belong to the
same group, and they cannot move and belong to other groups. The reason may be that each
group has dierent beliefs or belongs to dierent ethnic, religious, or occupational categories,
so it has no incentive to cooperate with other groups. We can, therefore, interpret a group as
the representative agent.
Since each group has the same preference, it has the same utility function. The utility
function is assumed to be CRRA. The discounted sum of the utility is, therefore, represented
as follows. Z 1
0
ci(t)
1 
1   e
 tdt;  > 0;  6= 1; i = 1; 2;    ; n (1)
where ci(t) is group i's consumption at instantaneous time t,  is the inverse of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in consumption, and  is the subjective rate of time preference.
2.1 Secure and Insecure Property Rights
In the economy, there are two capital stocks: the common capital and the private capital.
The common capital stock is generally regarded as insecure property right assets; e.g., big,
clean sheries; underground oil; and forests. In the existing literature, private capital has
been interpreted in a number of ways, including small, private, and stagnant lakes and bank
accounts in foreign developed countries that cannot be deprived by other groups. The common
capital stock is assumed to allow each group to have a larger marginal prot than the private-
access capital does. In the case of sheries, common sheries are large and highly nutritious.
The marginal productivity of sh in common sheries is, therefore, larger than that in small,
private, and stagnant sheries. In the case of bank accounts, the interest rate in foreign
2Social fractionalization and polarization are important issues in the study of developing countries. Easterly
and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) empirically show a positive correlation between highly fractionalized
societies and low growth rates. Hence, it is natural to assume the presence of n interest groups.
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developed countries is lower than that of developing countries.
Each group decides how much common capital is appropriated, consumed and invested in
order to accumulate its own private capital. Taking the opponents' behavior into account,
each group can appropriate any share it desires from the common capital stock. The resource
appropriated by a group is used for the consumption of the group or investment in private
capital.
Here, we examine the interaction between the common sector and the private sector. For
this purpose, we assume that for each group, a portion of its private capital stock must be used
for production in the common sector. Since a government or the society in the economy knows
that excess use of the resource occurs, it requires all groups to invest in the common sector in
order to avoid that phenomenon. In rice cropping, interest groups typically use the common
source of water. They nance the cost of maintaining and managing irrigation facilities. Other
interpretations can be considered. In the shery case, some sh are moved to the bountiful
sheries { the common sector{ because the private sheries are stagnant. This implies that
there exists a positive spillover into the common sector. In the bank account case, interest
groups face an expropriation risk. A government mandatorily withdraws assets from bank
accounts in foreign developed countries that cannot be deprived by other groups. Knack and
Keefer (1995) refer to this as the risk of 'outright conscation' and 'forced nationalization' of
private investments by governments.
In the common sector, an output is produced from the aggregate capital, which is composed
of the common capital stock and the sum of a part of group i's private capital stock. We assume
that the production function is additively separable for analytical simplicity. The common-
access capital stock, therefore, evolves according to the following dierential equation:
_K(t) = A
"
K(t) +
nX
i=1
uihi(t)
#
 
nX
i=1
di(t); (2)
where K(t) 2 R+ is the common capital stock, A is the productivity of the common sector,
ui 2 (0; 1) is the rate of the private sector contribution to the common sector, and di(t) 2 R+
is the amount appropriated by interest group i. The aggregate capital stock is represented as
K(t) +
Pn
i=1 uihi(t).
As for the private sector, the resource extracted by each interest group can be either
consumed or invested in its private and secure capital, but a fraction of the private capital
is used for investment in the common sector. The private capital stock of group i, therefore,
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evolves according to the following dierential equation:
_hi(t) = B(1  ui)hi(t) + di(t)  ci(t); i = 1; 2;    ; n; (3)
where hi(t) 2 R+ is group i's private capital stock, B is the technology level of the private
sector, and ci(t) 2 R+ is group i's consumption. It is plausible that the technology level of the
private sector is common because of the assumption of symmetric groups.
Note that we assume that the government sets the rate, ui, before each group i solves its
problem. This means that ui is assumed to be an exogenous and constant parameter. In
addition, since we focus on homogeneous interest groups, the contribution rate is assumed to
be common to all interest groups.
Assumption 1. The marginal product of the common sector is larger than that of the private
sector; A > B. The contribution rate is common to all groups; ui = u for all i.
2.2 The Solution Concept: Markov Perfect Equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (henceforth, MPE) of the noncooperative
game. In the present model, each group i has two Markovian strategies: the consumption
strategy  i and the appropriation strategy i. These strategies are functions  i : Rn+1+ ! R+
and i : Rn+1+ ! R+, respectively. This means that group i chooses its consumption and
appropriation according to the feedback rules ci(t) =  i(K(t); h(t)) and di(t) = i(K(t); h(t)).
Let us dene h as an n-dimensional vector; that is h = (h1; h2;    ; hn). Strategies  i and i
are called symmetric if for all i and j(6= i) the relations  i =  j and i = j hold. Therefore,
the denition of MPE is as follows.
Denition 1. The Markov strategies constitute MPE if and only if each group i's problem
maximizing (1) subject to (2) (3), any given initial stock K0 and h0, and cj(t) =  j (K(t); h(t))
and the opponents' strategies dj(t) = 

j(K(t); h(t)) for all j(6= i) have an optimal solution
which satises equilibrium strategies ci (t) =  

i (K(t); h(t)) and d

i (t) = 

i (K(t); h(t)).
From the above discussion, one can understand the information structure dened in the
present paper. The government and each interest group can observe not only the common-
access capital stock but also all the private capital stocks due to the introduction of the
contribution ratio u. Therefore, both strategies in our model depend on the common-access
capital stock and all private-access capital stocks.
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2.3 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation: Group i's Problem
Each group chooses the optimal levels of consumption and appropriation at each instant time
t to maximize (1) subject to (2), (3), the opponents' strategies, and the initial levels of capital.
Our model is, thus, a dierential game among n interest groups where the control variables
are c and d, and the state variables are the common capital stock K and the private capital
stock h. Since we consider only a symmetric group case, we focus on one group, group i, in
the discussion below.
An MPE is generally derived through the dynamic programming technique and must satisfy
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. The HJB equation of group i is as follows: for
all t  0 and i = 1; 2;    ; n,
Vi(K;h) = max
ci;di

c1 i
1   +
@Vi
@K

 
A
"
K + u
nX
i=1
hi
#
  di  
X
j 6=i
j
!
+
@Vi
@hi
 (B(1  u)hi + di   ci) +
X
j 6=i
@Vi
@hj
 (B(1  u)hj + j    j)

: (4)
Furthermore, the value function Vi must satisfy the following boundary condition:
lim
t!1
Vi(K;h) exp( t) = 0: (5)
Dierentiating the HJB equation with respect to ci and di yields optimal conditions, for
all i,
c i =
@Vi
@hi
; (6)
@Vi
@hi
=
@Vi
@K
: (7)
Equations (6) and (7) constitute a set of MPE solutions. Note that due to the assumption of
the utility function, the maximization problem satises the second-order conditions as well.
The Markov strategies simultaneously satisfy (6) and (7). Substituting these conditions
into the HJB equation and using the envelope theorem, we obtain the following equations.
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
@Vi
@K
=
@2Vi
@K2

 
A
"
K + u
nX
i=1
hi
#
  i  
X
j 6=i
j
!
+
@Vi
@K

 
A 
X
j 6=i
@j
@K
!
+
@2Vi
@K@hi
 (B(1  u)hi + i    i ) +
X
j 6=i
@Vi
@hj


@j
@K
  @ 

j
@K

+
X
j 6=i
@2Vi
@K@hj
  B(1  u)hj + j    j  ; (8)

@Vi
@hi
=
@2Vi
@hi@K

 
A
"
K + u
nX
i=1
hi
#
  i  
X
j 6=i
j
!
+
@Vi
@K

 
Au 
X
j 6=i
@j
@hi
!
+
@2Vi
@h2i
 (B(1  u)hi + i    i ) +
@Vi
@hi
B(1  u)
+
X
j 6=i
@2Vi
@hi@hj
  B(1  u)hj + j    j +X
j 6=i
@Vi
@hj


@j
@hi
  @ 

j
@hi

; (9)
and

@Vi
@hj
=
@2Vi
@hj@K

 
A
"
K + u
nX
i=1
hi
#
  i   j  
X
k 6=i;j
k
!
+
@Vi
@K

 
Au  @

j
@hj
 
X
k 6=i;j
@k
@hj
!
+
@2Vi
@hj@hi
 (B(1  u)hi + i    i ) +
@2Vi
@h2j
  B(1  u)hj + j    j 
+
@Vi
@hj


B(1  u) + @

j
@hj
  @ 

j
@hj

+
X
k 6=i;j
@Vi
@hk


@k
@hj
  @ 

k
@hj

+
X
k 6=i;j
@2Vi
@hj@hk
 (B(1  u)hk + k    k) : (10)
The functions with an asterisk represent the optimal strategies in the model. In the following
analysis, we focus on the symmetric MPE and show that the growth rates of ci, di, and hi, for
all i and K grow at a positive constant. Before proceeding to the balanced growth analysis,
we refer to a restriction of strategy space for consumption and appropriation.
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3 A Special Case of the Model
As a benchmark case, we rst consider the case where the value function is independent of the
opponents' private capital stocks. This is the same situation analyzed in Tornell and Velasco
(1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999). In the next section, we analyze a more general case where
each group values the opponents' private capital. We conjecture the following value function:
Vi(K;h) =
(K + hi)
1 
1   ; (11)
where  and  are constant, and  is a n   1 dimensional constant vector. As for the con-
sumption strategy  (K;h) and the appropriation strategy (K;h), we assume that they are
linear strategies; that is  i(K;h) = a
0+ aK + ehi+ bZi and i(K;h) = K + hi+ Zi, where
a0, a, e, b, , and  are unknown constant. The consumption strategy is a standard linear
strategy. For notational simplicity, we dene the aggregate private capital of the opponents'
group,
P
j 6=i hj, as Zi. Since we focus on the symmetric MPE, it is assumed to be the equal
coecients b and  among all the opponents' private capital hj for all j(6= i).
Substituting these into (8)  (10), we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The optimal parameters are obtained as follows.
a0 = b = 0; a = e =  
1
 =

   1


B(1  u) + 

;
 = 1;  =
A B(1  u)
n  1 ; and  =
Au
n  1 :
Proof. See Appendix A.
We can easily conrm that  and  are always positive. Although the sign of a is ambiguous,
amust be positive because this is the coecient of consumption strategy. Therefore, we impose
the assumption guaranteeing that this is positive below.3
Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) considered the situation in which
there is no contribution of private capital stocks to the common sector; that is, u = 0. In
this situation, the appropriation strategy is independent of the private capital stocks and thus
 = 0. In contrast, we consider the case where u is positive and a fraction of the private capital
3See Assumption 2.
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stocks contribute to the production of the common capital. Thus, the appropriation strategy
is aected by the stock of the private capital.
3.1 Balanced Growth Rates
In this subsection, we derive the balanced growth rates of common capital, private capital,
consumption, and appropriation. Before proceeding to deriving them, we impose the following
assumption.
Assumption 2. We assume that the following relations hold:
A
n  1  B(1  u)

n
n  1  
1


<


<
B(1  u)

; and nB(1  u) > A: (12)
Note that under this assumption we can conrm that the coecients of the consumption
strategy is positive because the following relations are satised.
1  


B(1  u) < A
n  1  B(1  u)

n
n  1  
1


:
Let us derive the complete dynamics of the model. In the case of symmetric equilibrium,
the amount of group i's private capital stock is equal to that of all the other groups j (6= i) so
that hi = hj and thus the dynamic system of hj is identical to that of hi. This implies that the
n  1 state equations of private capital are redundant. The complete dynamics are, therefore,
represented in two state equations, _K and hi. Dividing equations (2) and (3) by social capital
K and private capital hi, respectively, yields:
_K
K
=
nB(1  u)  A
n  1  
nAu
n  1
hi
K
; (13)
_hi
hi
=

A B(1  u)
n  1  

   1


B(1  u)  


K
hi
+
nAu
n  1 +
1

(B(1  u)  ): (14)
For the growth rate of the common capital to be positive, the rst term must be positive;
that is nB(1   u) > A. This is guaranteed by Assumption 2. Furthermore, on the balanced
growth path, growth rates of K and hi must be constant and thus the ratio of K to hi must
be constant. This requires that both growth rates are the same at the steady state level.
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Lemma 2. The balanced growth rates of the common capital and the private capital are
_K
K
=
_hi
hi
=
1

(B(1  u)  ): (15)
Proof. For notational simplicity, we set   hi
K
. On the balanced growth path, the growth rate
of social capital is the same as that of the private capital so that (13) and (14) are a coincident
nB(1  u)  A
n  1  
nAu
n  1 =

A B(1  u)
n  1  

   1


B(1  u)  


1

+
nAu
n  1+
1

(B(1 u) ):
Arranging this with respect to , we obtain
(+ 1)

nAu
n  1+D

= 0;
where we dene D  1

(B(1   u)   )   nB(1 u) A
n 1 , which is negative under Assumption 2.
Since  must be positive, the solution  is
 =  n  1
nAu
D =
n  1
nAu

nB(1  u)  A
n  1  
1

(B(1  u)  )

> 0: (16)
Substituting this into equations (13) and (14), we conrm that the steady state growth rates
are
_K
K
=
_hi
hi
= 1

(B(1  u)  ).
hi
K
h˙i = 0
K˙ = 0
Figure 1: The phase diagram
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In the present model, there is no transition dynamics like that found in the AK model.
The phase diagram is, therefore, illustrated in Figure 1.4
Using Lemma 2, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the strategy prole f(i;  i)gni=1 dened by
 i(K;h) = a
0 + aK + ehi + bZi and i(K;h) = K + hi + Zi forms a symmetric MPE.
The balanced growth rates are
_K
K
=
_hi
hi
=
_di
di
=
_ci
ci
=
1

(B(1  u)  ): (17)
Proof. For the rst part, we know that, in the equilibrium, parameters are given by Lemma
1. These constitute an MPE.
Before we prove the boundary condition to be satised, we derive the growth rates of
consumption and appropriation. Dierentiating the consumption with respect to time and
dividing this by consumption itself, we get
_ci
ci
=
_K + _h
K + hi
=

B(1  u)  A B(1 u)
n 1 +D

K + 1

(B(1  u)  )hi
K + hi
=
1

(B(1  u)  ):
Similarly, we derive the growth rate of appropriation. From Lemma 2,
_di
di
=
A B(1 u)
n 1
_K + nAu
n 1
_hi
A B(1 u)
n 1 K +
nAu
n 1hi
=
A B(1 u)
n 1 +
nAu
n 1
hi
K
A B(1 u)
n 1 +
nAu
n 1
hi
K
_K
K
=
1

(B(1  u)  ):
Finally, we check the boundary condition. Substituting the consumption strategy, which is
ci = a(K + hi), into the value function and using the growth rate of consumption yields
Vi(K;h) =
(K0 + hi0)
1 
1   exp

1  


(B(1  u)  )t

:
The boundary condition is, therefore,
lim
t!1
Vi(K;h) exp( t) = (K0 + hi0)
1 
1   limt!1 exp

1  


B(1  u)  


t

:
Since this converges to zero under Assumption 2, the boundary condition is satised.
4Under Assumption 2, we can conrm that the slope of _hi = 0 line is steeper than that of _K = 0 line.
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In our model, the production of private capital involves no common capital. This means
that the private sector is relatively intensive in private capital. In the situation, the balanced
growth rates depend only on the marginal product of the private sector, which is qualitatively
similar to the result obtained in the Uzawa-Lucas model.5
3.2 The Voracity Eect
In this subsection, we consider the voracity eect. The voracity eect is one of the most
interesting results in the literature. It can be dened as the phenomenon in which countries
with multiple interest groups respond to a positive technology shock in the common sector
by increasing the appropriation rate, and thus the growth rates become slow. In the existing
literature (e.g., Tornell and Velasco (1992), Tornell and Lane (1999), and Long and Sorger
(2006)), under some circumstances, the voracity eect is observed.
Proposition 1 states that the balanced growth rate is independent of the productivity of
the common sector, A. This implies that, in a situation in which a fraction of the private
capital stock is used for investment in the common sector, a positive technology shock in the
common sector has no eect on the growth rate as Tornell and Lane (1999) dene. This is a
result of the specialization in the production functions as seen in the Uzawa-Lucas model.
However, we can conrm that the contribution rate plays the same role as a technology
shock in the common sector.
Proposition 2. An increase in the contribution ratio,u, leads to an increase in the appropri-
ation rate and a decrease in the balanced growth rate.
Proof. The appropriation strategy is di =
A B(1 u)
n 1 K +
Au
n 1hi+
Au
n 1Zi. The derivatives of this
with respect to u is @di
@u
= BK+Ahi+AZi
n 1 > 0. Similarly, dierentiating (22) yields
@

_K
K

@u
=  B

< 0:
The rate is determined by the government in this economy and is an exogenous variable
for each group. When u increases, a group is forced to invest its private capital in the common
5See Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988).
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sector. At the same time, however, the remaining n  1 groups also are forced to invest their
private capital, and this is regarded as a positive externality for the group. The externality
dominates the impact of an increase in u on the group and, hence, causes it to further extract
the resource. In other words, since the eect of the positive externality is similar to that of a
windfall gain on the productivity in the common sector, a higher u accelerates the voracious
behaviour of the competing interest groups. In the private sector, on the other hand, each
group is forced to reduce its input, which leads to the reductions in the output of private
capital and thus the balanced growth rates. This is another channel of the voracity eect.
3.3 The Comparison of Common Capital Growth Rates
We compare the balanced growth rate of the common capital obtained above with that in
Tornel and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999). In their model, the growth rate of
the common capital is g = nB A
n 1 . We subtract (22) from g and then obtain
nB   A
n  1  
1

(B(1  u)  ) > nB(1  u)  A
n  1  
1

(B(1  u)  ) > 0:
The second inequality holds due to Assumption 2. This result is summarized below.
Proposition 3. The growth rate of the common capital under u = 0 is higher than that under
u 6= 0.
In the case where the value function is independent of the opponents' private capital stocks,
each group does not value the opponents' private capital stocks. The contribution of the private
capital to the common sector increases not only the common capital but also the amount of
appropriation because of Zi. The latter eect exceeds the former eect and thus the growth
rate of the common sector declines. In addition, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that since a higher
contribution rate causes interest groups to extract more resources from the common capital,
the optimal contribution rate is zero. We can interpret the contribution rate as the level of
property rights protection for private capital. u = 0 means full property rights protection.
When u = 1, private capital is not secured or all interest groups can not invest in thier own
capital. Therefore, a higher u reduces the growth rate of the economy.
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4 A General Case
In this section, we relax the assumption in the previous section and consider the case where
the value function depends on the opponents' private capital stocks. Thus we conjecture the
value function as follows:
Vi(K;h) =
(K + hi + Zi)
1 
1   ; (18)
where , , and  are unknown constants. Note that although  and  are usually positive, 
can be either positive, negative, or zero, depending on the model. The consumption strategy is
the same as in the previous section, i.e.  i(K;h) = a
0+aK+ehi+bZi. As for the appropriation
strategy, we assume that it depends on the aggregate capital in the common sector, following
the existing literature, i.e. i(K;h) =  [K + uhi + uZi].
6 Parameters a0, a, b, , and e are
unknown constants.
Substituting these strategies and (18) into equations (8)   (10), we obtain the candidates
for the optimal parameters.
Lemma 3. The candidates for the optimal parameters are obtained as follows.
a = e =  
1
 =
uB(1  u)
[(n  1) + 1  un] ;
 =
y py2 + 4(n  1)[+ (1  u)(   1)B]uB(1  u)
2(n  1)[+ (1  u)(   1)B] ;
 =
A[(n  1) + 1  un] B(1  u)[(n  1) + 1]
(1  )(n  1)[(n  1) + 1  un] ;
a0 = 0;  = 1; and b = a;
where y  (un  1)+ (1  u)[n(1 + u) + 1](   1)B.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The lemma states that there are two candidates for ; one is positive and the other is
negative. The parameters a and  must be positive in the present model. For a to be positive,
the term (n  1) + 1  un must be positive (negative) if  is positive (negative). The sign of
 is not immediately conrmed. In the next subsection, we show that one of two candidates
6There is another unknown parameter, , here. If we use the previous appropriation strategy, we cannot
identify all the parameters. Thus, we have to eliminate one unknown parameter.
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is ruled out by considering the dynamic system of the model. After this, we will conrm the
positivity of a and .
Before proceeding to the next subsection, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 3. We assume that  > B(1  u)(1  ).
In addition, we derive the growth rate of consumption and the balanced growth ratio of
private capital stock to common capital stock,   hi
K
.
Lemma 4. The growth rate of consumption is
g =
_ci
ci
=
B(1  u)(   u)[(n  1) + 1]
[(n  1) + 1  un] : (19)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The lemma states that the growth rate of group i's consumption is constant over time. For
the growth rate of consumption to be positive, it is necessary that  > u if  is positive and
(n 1)+ is negative if  is negative. Conversely, if  > u, (n 1)+1 un > u(n 1)+1 un =
1 u > 0, and if (n  1)+1 < 0, the equation (n  1)+1 un is negative. Therefore, these
conditions guarantee that the parameter a is positive.
4.1 Dynamic System and Stability
We derive the complete dynamics of the model as follows. As explained in the previous section,
in the case of symmetric equilibrium, we can represent the dynamic system in terms of the
following two equations composed by the common capital, K, and group i's private capital,
hi:
_K = (A  n)K + n(A  n)uhi; (20)
_hi = (   a)K + fB(1  u) + nu  a[(n  1) + 1]ghi: (21)
For the growth rate of the common capital to be positive, the term A  n must be positive.7
As for (21), the coecient of K is positive if  is positive and negative if  is negative.8 In
addition, the coecient of hi is positive in spite of the sign of .
9 Therefore, we can illustrate
7It will be numerically conrmed in Section 4.2.
8The proof is given in Appendix D.
9In the case where  is negative, it is clear because (n  1) + 1 < 0. In the case where  is positive, from
Lemma 3, we can conrm B(1  u) + nu  a[(n  1) + 1] = B(1 u)( u) + n(   a)u > 0.
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the phase diagrams of the model as follows.
hi
K
h˙i = 0
K˙ = 0
(a):  > 0 case
hi
K
h˙i = 0
K˙ = 0
(b):  < 0 case
Figure 2: The phase diagrams
In the case where  is positive, we can easily conrm that the slope of _hi = 0 line is steeper
than that of _K = 0 line. The dynamic system is unstable and there is no transition dynamics
as seen in the previous section . By contrast, in the case where  is negative, the dynamic
system does not ensure the positivity of the state variables over time. Therefore, the negative
 is not optimal.
In what follows, we show that the growth rates of all the other variables correspond to that
of consumption and characterize the balanced growth path. As seen in the previous section, we
dene the balanced growth ratio of private capital stock to common capital stock as   hi=K.
We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the strategy prole f(i;  i)gni=1 dened by
i(K;h) and  i(K;h) forms a symmetric MPE. In the equilibrium, the optimal strategies are
 i = aK + ahi + bZi and 

i =  [K + uhi + uZi] ;
where the optimal parameters are
a = e =  
1
 =
uB(1  u)
[(n  1) + 1  un] ;
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 =
y +
p
y2 + 4(n  1)[+ (1  u)(   1)B]uB(1  u)
2(n  1)[+ (1  u)(   1)B] ;
 =
A[(n  1) + 1  un] B(1  u)[(n  1) + 1]
(1  )(n  1)[(n  1) + 1  un] ;
a0 = 0;  = 1; and b = a;
where y  (un  1)+ (1  u)[n(1 + u) + 1](   1)B. The balanced growth rates are
g =
_ci
ci
=
_di
di
=
_K
K
=
_hi
hi
=
B(1  u)(   u)[(n  1) + 1]
[(n  1) + 1  un] ; (22)
and the ratio of private capital stock to common capital stock is
 =
g   (A  n)
nu(A  n) :
Proof. See Appendix E.
Note that the marginal productivity in the common sector and that in the private sector
are constant due to the assumption of a linear technology, so that balanced growth is achieved
without transitional dynamics in the economy. The growth rate of the common capital is
equivalent to the growth rate of the private capital. All the variables grow at the same
positive and constant rate regardless of the initial level of common-private capital ratio (see
Figure 2(a)). Note also that the balanced growth rate is not dependent on the marginal
productivity of the common sector because  is also independent of A. This implies that there
is no standard voracity eect as asserted by Tornell and Lane (1999).
Furthermore, must be positive because it is the ratio of private capital to common capital.
Positive A n is required for keeping the accumulation of the common capital over time. The
ratio  has a nite positive value unless A  n is close to zero or exceeds the growth rate. If
A n is negative,  is also negative. Therefore, positive  means that A n is positive and
is smaller than the growth rate.
At the end of this section, we derive another proposition.
Proposition 5. The opponents' private capital stock has a positive eect on a player's con-
sumption.
Proof. When the value function depends on the opponents' private capital stocks, optimal a
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and  are positive. Dierentiating the consumption strategy with respect to hj yields
@ i
@hj
=
a > 0.
The capital ow from the common sector to the private sector involves a new type of exter-
nality: a positive contribution rate has the same eect qualitatively as a windfall gain on the
productivity of the common sector. This causes a greater extraction of common capital from
the common sector. A part of the increased extraction is, then, allocated to consumption. As
a consequence, the new capital ow has a positive eect on a group's equilibrium consumption
strategy.
4.2 A Numerical Example
In this section, we consider the eect of the contribution ratio, u, on the parameters, a, , ,
g, and . We will explore how these parameters change as the ratio increases. However, due
to the complicities associated with investigating this analytically we do so numerically. We
rst need to assert values to the structural parameters of the model. In the numerical analysis
below, we use the following values as the baseline:  = 2,  = 0:04, A = 1:0, n = 5, and
B = 0:3. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the discount rate, and the technology
level of the common sector are followed by the values in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993).
The number of interest groups is equal to that in Lindner and Strulik (2004) and Strulik
(2012). We set the technology level of the private sector to 0:3 in order to characterize the
balanced growth comparative statics well. Figure 3 shows the eect on the major parameters
and variables of the model.
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Figure 3: The eects of the contribution rate on major parameters, private-common capital
ratio, and growth rate
Figure 3(a) shows that the appropriation parameter, , rises and one of consumption pa-
rameter, a, declines as the contribution rate increases, u. As explained in the previous section,
when u increases, group i is forced to invest its private capital in the common sector whereas
the other groups are also forced to invest their private capital. Since the latter eect domi-
nates the group i' eect, this is regarded as a windfall for group i and it further extracts the
resource. The gure also shows that the parameter restriction    a > 0 is satised. Figure
3(b) traces out the eects of u on a coecient of the value function, (18). We can conrm that
 is an increasing function of and larger than u. A rise in  causes the marginal value of the
opponents' private capital to increase and those of the common and group i's private capital
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to fall.10 Thus, a is a decreasing function of u.
Figure 3(c) shows that  has a U-shape, i.e.,  is decreasing with respect to u when u is
relatively low, and  is increasing when u is relatively high. The last result is interpreted as
follows. When u is relatively low, the marginal increase of appropriation is dominated by that
of u. On the other hand, when u is relatively high, the marginal increase of appropriation
dominates that of u. Therefore, there exists a point where both eects are set o. In addition,
when u is relatively large, the positivity of  is not satised. When B is 0:3, for example, 
is negative over the region where u is 0:31. This means that an increase in u leads to so much
appropriation that the economy cannot be sustainable. On the other hand, when B is 0:32, 
is smaller than a for a relatively small u.
Figure 3(d) shows that the balanced growth rate declines as u increases. As u increases, the
appropriation parameter is increasing and thus the balanced growth rate is decreasing. This
is the same phenomenon and another channel of the voracity eect as discussed in Section
3.2. Similarly, the growth rate of the common capital will be smaller than that in Tornell
and Velasco (1992). To see this, we consider the case in which B is 0:32.11 The growth rate
of the common capital in their model is g = nB A
n 1 = 0:15. This is always higher than that
in our model, which is the same result obtained in Proposition 3. Therefore, in the general
case, each agent values the opponents' private capital stock; that is their private capital has
a positive eect on its consumption strategy. This causes each group to extract the resource
still further, thus prompting the growth rate to decline. The gure also shows that, given
a contribution ratio, a higher B increases the rate of economic growth. A windfall gain in
productivity enables each group to more eectively invest in its own capital, which decreases
the incentive to extract resources from the common sector. This is represented by a decline
in the appropriation parameter,  in gure 3(a). This will increase the aggregate capital
accumulation, ameliorating the tragedy of the commons.
In addition gures 3(c) and (d) provide a testable implication of our approach. Except for
the case in which u is extremely small, a higher u implies the higher level of the private capital
stocks. Therefore, these gures suggest that in developing countries with weak property rights
systems the growth rates become low with a larger contribution rate.
10See Proposition 4.
11In case where B is 0:28 or 0:3, the conditions required in Assumption 2 under is not satised under u = 0.
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5 Conclusion
We analyzed a developing economy with multiple interest groups. That economy included a
common sector without secure property rights and the private sectors with secure property
rights. A government required each group to invest a fraction of its own private capital in
the common sector in order to protect the commons. In this situation, we studied how the
introduction of capital ow from the private sector to the common sector aects the growth
rate of an economy, and how this is related to the voracious behaviours of competing interest
groups. . First, we showed that the balanced growth rates were independent of the technology
level in the common sector. This implies that there is no standard voracity eect in the
sense that Tornell and Lane (1999) dene. We also showed that, when each group values
the opponents' private capital, their capital has a positive eect on a group's equilibrium
consumption strategy. Finally, we showed that an increase in the contribution rate leads to an
increase in appropriation, and hence the balanced growth becomes slow. This paper predicts
that the capital ow from the private sector to the common sector has a negative eect on
economic growth and that a policy designed to preserve the commons leads to a harmful eect
on the economy.
Our model has some limitations that point to several directions for possible extensions.
First, we assumed that the contribution rate is exogenously chosen by a government for ana-
lytical simplicity. It is possible that the government or another agent chooses the contribution
rate endogenously. Second, since we assumed homogeneous interest groups, we could not an-
alyze what happens when there are heterogeneous interest groups. Introducing some kinds of
asymmetry into the model would be an important issue. Third, we assumed simplied pro-
duction, i.e., linear technology. Other types of production and utility functions could also be
considered. For example, it would be interesting to use a form of production with externality,
as Mino (2006) and Itaya and Mino (2007) did, and to add appropriation costs and wealth
eects to the utility function, as Long and Sorger (2006) did. Finally, we have treated only the
linear Markov strategies. Characterizing equilibrium under other Markov strategies, including
non-linear Markov strategies, would be important.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
In the case where the value function is independent of the opponents' private capital stocks,
(11), we obtain
@Vi
@hj
=
@2Vi
@hj@K
=
@2Vi
@hj@hi
=
@2Vi
@h2j
= 0:
Substituting these and appropriation strategies into (10) yields @V
@K
(Au  (n  1)) = 0. Since
@V
@K
6= 0, for the equation to be satised, Au   (n   1) must be zero and thus  = Au
n 1 . The
optimal condition (7) requires that  = 1 and that the conjectured value function must hold
@2V
@K2
=
@2V
@hi@K
=
@2V
@h2i
=  (K + hi)  1:
These conditions mean that (8) is equivalent to (9), which leads to  = A B(1 u)
n 1 .
Next, from the optimal condition (6), the value function (11), and the consumption strategy,
we conrm that
(a0 + aK + ehi + bZi)
 
= c i =
@Vi
@K
=

 
1
K +  
1
hi
 
:
For the condition to be satised, a0 = b = 0 and a = e =  
1
 are required.
Since we focus on symmetric equilibrium, hi is equivalent to hj for j 6= i at equilibrium.
Using this and the results obtained above, we can arrange (8) as follows.
[ B(1  u)]@Vi
@K
=
@2Vi
@K2
[B(1  u)(K + hi)  ci] ()  B(1  u) =  B(1  u) +   1 :
This leads to
a = e =  
1
 =

   1


B(1  u) + 

:
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3
First, we conrm that, in the case of (18), the optimal condition (7) requires  = 1 and thus
the following relations are obtained.
@Vi
@hj
= 
@Vi
@K
;
@2Vi
@K2
=
@2Vi
@hi@K
=
@2Vi
@h2i
;
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@2Vi
@hj@K
=
@2Vi
@hj@hi
= 
@2Vi
@K2
; and
@2Vi
@h2j
= 2
@2Vi
@K2
:
Next, substituting these and the strategies into equations (8)  (10), we obtain
@2Vi
@K2
 F (K;h) = f  A+ (1  )(n  1) + a(n  1)g@Vi
@K
; (23)
@2Vi
@K2
 F (K;h) = f  u[A  (1  )(n  1)] B(1  u) + a2(n  1)g@Vi
@K
;
and

@2Vi
@K2
 F (K;h) = f  u[A  (1  )(n  1)]  B(1  u) + a[1 + (n  2)]g@Vi
@K
;
where the function F (K;h) represents
F (K;h) = fA  (1  )(n  1)   a[1 + (n  1)]gK
+ fu[A  (1  )(n  1)] +B(1  u)  a[1 + 2(n  1)]ghi
+ fu[A  (1  )(n  1)] + B(1  u)  a[2 + (n  2)]gZi:
We can summarize the three equations as follows:
(1  )(n  1)(1  u) = (A B)(1  u)  a(n  1)(1  ); (24)
(1  )(n  1)(   u) = A(   u)  [B(1  u)  a(1  )]: (25)
The unknown parameters, a, , and , must satisfy both of the above equations simultane-
ously. First, if  = 1, the above conditions require that the contribution rate u must be a unity
because of the assumption A > B. This contradicts the assumption u 2 (0; 1), and thus this
is not an equilibrium. Second, we consider the possibility that  is zero. Substituting  = 0
into (24) and (25), we get two equations, (n   1) = A   B and (n   1) = A. For the two
equations to be satised simultaneously, B must be zero, which contradicts the positivity of
B. Therefore,  = 0 is not an equilibrium. Finally, we consider the case  6= 0; 1. Substituting
(24) into (25), we obtain a2(n  1)  ua(n  1) + a(1  u)  uB(1  u) = 0. We solve this
for a,
a =
uB(1  u)
[(n  1) + 1  un] :
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Substituting it into (24), we obtain the appropriation rate :
 =
A B
(1  )(n  1)  
uB
(n  1) + 1  un (26)
=
A[(n  1) + 1  un] B(1  u)[(n  1) + 1]
(1  )(n  1)[(n  1) + 1  un] :
Next, from the optimal condition (6) and (18), and the consumption strategy, we conrm
that
(a0 + aK + ehi + bZi)  = c i =
@Vi
@K
=

 
1
K +  
1
hi + 
  1
Zi
 
;
which leads to a0 = 0, a = e =  
1
 , and b = a.
Finally, since we focus on symmetric equilibrium, hi is equivalent to hj for j 6= i at equilib-
rium. We substitute the above results into (23), and after some manipulation, we obtain the
following equation:
 B + (n  1)uB(   u)
(n  1) + 1  un

(K + hi + Zi)
 
=  (K + hi + Zi) 1 

B(1  u)(   u)[(n  1) + 1]
[(n  1) + 1  un]

(K + hi + Zi):
It is rewritten as (n  1)[+(1 u)(  1)B]2  y  uB(1 u) = 0, where y  (un  1)+
(1  u)[n(1 + u) + 1](   1)B. Solving the quadratic equation for ,
 =
y py2 + 4(n  1)[+ (1  u)(   1)B]uB(1  u)
2(n  1)[+ (1  u)(   1)B] :
This implies that if the quadratic equation has two dierent real roots, one is negative and the
other is positive.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 4
Let us derive the growth rate of consumption. The consumption of group i is represented by
ci =  

i = a(K + hi + Zi). Dierentiating this with respect to t and dividing it by ci yields
_ci
ci
=
_K + _hi +  _Zi
K + hi + Zi
:
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The state dynamics of the model are represented as follows.
_K = (A  n)K + (Au  nu)hi + (Au  nu)Zi;
_hi = (   a)K + (B(1  u) + u  a)hi + (u  a)Zi;
_hj = (   a)K + (u  a)hi + (B(1  u) + u  a)hj + (u  a)
X
k 6=i;j
hk:
Substituting these into the numerator, we obtain
_K + _hi +  _Zi = [A  (n  1)  a+ (n  1)(   a)]K
+ [Au  u(n  1) +B(1  u)  a(n  1)(u  a)]hi
+ [Au  u(n  1)  a + (B(1  u) + u  a) + (n  2)(u  a)]Zi;
=
B(1  u)(   u)[(n  1) + 1]
[(n  1) + 1  un] (K + hi + Zi):
Therefore, we obtain the following growth rate of consumption,
_ci
ci
=
B(1  u)(   u)[(n  1) + 1]
[(n  1) + 1  un] :
Appendix D. The sign of    a
According to Lemma 3, we can represent    a as follows:
   a = A[(n  1) + 1  un] B(1  u)[nu+ (   u)(1 + (n  1))]
(n  1)(1  )[(n  1) + 1  un] : (27)
Similarly, we can represent A  n as follows:
A  n = [(n  1) + 1]fnB(1  u)  A[(n  1) + 1  un]g
(1  )(n  1)[(n  1) + 1  un] :
We subtract A  n from the growth rate of consumption, g:
g   (A  n) =
[(n  1) + 1]fA[(n  1) + 1  un]
 B(1  u)[nu+ (   u)(1 + (n  1))]g
(n  1)(1  )[(n  1) + 1  un] : (28)
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Substituting (28) into (27), we obtain
   a = g   (A  n)
(n  1) + 1 : (29)
If  is positive, the denominator in the right-hand side is positive and if  is negative, it must
be negative because of the need to assure positive growth of consumption.
Furthermore, on the balanced growth path of the model, the growth rate of consumption
and common capital must coincide; that is from (19) and (20),
g =
_K
K
= (A  n) + nu(A  n)hi
K
;
and therefore we obtain the ratio of private capital to common capital:
 =
hi
K
=
g   (A  n)
nu(A  n) : (30)
Since  must be positive, the numerator g   (A  n) must be also positive. Therefore, from
(29);if  is positive,    a is positive and if  is negative,    a is negative.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4
First, we derive the symmetric MPE strategies. As discussed in 4.1,  is positive. Substituting
 into the parameters obtained in Lemma 3 yields the MPE parameters. Therefore, the optimal
strategies are  i = aK + ahi + bZi and 

i =  [K + uhi + uZi].
Next, the ratio of private capital stock to common capital stock is (30) obtained in Appendix
D. To derive the common and private capital growth rates, we divide (20) and (21) by K and
hi, respectively.
_K
K
= (A  n) + nu(A  n)hi
K
; (31)
_hi
hi
= (   a)K
hi
+B(1  u) + nu  a[(n  1) + 1]: (32)
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Substituting (30) into (31), we obtain
_K
K
=
B(1  u)(   u)[(n  1) + 1]
[(n  1) + 1  un] :
Also, substituting (30) into (32), we obtain
_hi
hi
=
1
(n  1) + 1

fg   (A  n)gK
hi
  nu(A  n)

+ g
=
B(1  u)(   u)[(n  1) + 1]
[(n  1) + 1  un] :
Third, we derive the growth rate of appropriation. The appropriation of group i is repre-
sented by di = [K + uhi + uZi]. As in the discussion above, since we focus on the symmetric
MPE, hi = hj for all j 6= i. Therefore, dierentiating this with respect to t yields
_di
di
=
_K + un _hi
K + unhi
:
On the balanced growth path, the growth rate of the common capital is equivalent to that of
the private capital, _K=K = _hi=hi, and thus
_di
di
=
_K
K
 
1 + nuhi
K

1 + nuhi
K
=
_K
K
=
B(1  u)(   u)[(n  1) + 1]
[(n  1) + 1  un] :
Finally, we check the boundary condition. Note that since the value function Vi(K;h) has
the properties Vi(0; 0) = 0 and strict concavity, holding the boundary condition (5) guarantees
that the transversality conditions are satised. In the same manner as the previous section,
for the boundary condition to be satised,
(K0 + hi0 + Zi0)
1 
1   limt!1 exp

Bu(1  u)(1  )(   1)
[(n  1) + 1  un]   f+ (   1)(1  u)Bgt

:
must converge to zero. If  > 1, it is easy to verify that this is satised. Let us consider the
case where 0 <  < 1. According to (26) in Appendix B,  must be smaller than one to assure
positive appropriation, which means that the rst term is negative. Under Assumption 3, the
equation  + (   1)(1   u)B is positive so that the second term is negative. Therefore, the
boundary condition is satised.
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